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Abstract 
Issues of morality and ethics have increasingly become more important in organizations 
and business settings. Traditionally, these issues of ethics and social responsibility in 
business settings have been discussed and commented on by prescriptive approaches that 
are grounded in philosophical traditions. Building on the idea that we need to develop a 
more comprehensive and complete understanding of the value that people assign to ethics 
and how it influences their actions and decisions, in the present article we discuss and 
review the importance and relevance of adopting also a descriptive approach that is 
grounded in the behavioral sciences (referred to as behavioral business ethics). This 
approach has the advantages to promote our insights into how people can show both good 
and bad behavior and why this is the case. Behavioral business ethics therefore represents 
an important research challenge for organizational researchers to pursue and engage more 
meaningfully with more prescriptive approaches. 
 
 
  
3 
 
 
On Understanding Unethical Behavior in Organizations:  
The Need for a Behavioral Business Ethics Approach 
It is by now clear to everyone that as a result of corporate failures in the moral 
domain, a critical challenge for organizations is to gain a deeper understanding of why 
ethical standards are so easily violated and accepted. Within workplaces we are 
confronted on a daily basis with many difficult choices, some of which include a moral 
component and hence create conflicts of interest where the decision-maker has to weigh 
the importance of commonly accepted moral principles (e.g. delivering safe and high-
quality products) versus the demands of a competitive market where profit seeking 
dominates. All too often, greed has turned out to be center-stage in our decisions, which 
was clearly illustrated when many banks had no problem distributing millions in bonuses 
± even guaranteed ones without any commitment to high performance - to those who 
eventually made decisions that drove the company and society at large into a financial 
crisis. Highly featured court cases in which investment banks are involved for fraud and 
misrepresenting information are no exception anymore.  
All of these decisions bring pain and hurt to the interests of society at large and 
makes that trust in our economic institutions and organizations are at an all-time low.  
Cases like the United Kingdom parliamentary expenses scandal show that unethical 
behaviors and decisions can bring forward significant financial and reputational damages 
to our society and organizations (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Even more so, at the level 
of the company, the downplaying of moral standards and lack of adherence to norms 
preventing unethical behavior and wrongdoings burden the reliability and profitability of 
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those same companies. For example, as pointed out by De Cremer (2014), corporate 
ethical failures led the German company Siemens to agree to a $1.6 billion settlement to 
remedy harmful consequences of their bribery actions in emerging markets and in a 
similar way the oil company Royal Dutch Shell was required to pay $150 million because 
they misrepresented information about their oil resources.    
As De Cremer, Tenbrunsel, and van Dijke (2010, p. 1) note, all ³these 
observations make clear that ethical failures have become an important reality for 
corporations, organizations, and societies at large and as a result there is a growing 
concern on how to manage and regulate such failures´. For this reason, it is essential that 
we develop a better understanding why the morals and ethical actions of so many 
business people seem to go out of the window as soon as self-interest can be served in the 
short term. To do this it is essential to also rely on evidence-based approaches and take 
stock of the research that is available at present. In light of this ambition, we argue that is 
necessary to take a look at how business ethics has been studied so far and how new 
approaches to this topic may help us to take the existing knowledge even further. 
Schminke (2010) has previously written about the difficulties with integrating descriptive 
and prescriptive approaches to business ethics. Alzola (2011) argued that since both 
approaches have their specificity, an integration is not the best way forward. Instead, 
Alzola (2011: 32) calls for a reconciliation, which he understands as a さdialog without 
hybridization, a dialog that starts with the premise of respecting the identity of those 
involved in the conversation.ざ The aim of the present paper is to recast prescriptive and 
descriptive business ethics in light of one another. For that purpose the paper is structured 
as follows. In the next section we first briefly sketch the business ethics theories within 
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the most important philosophical paradigms. We suggest that their theoretical 
developments are epistemologically driven, i.e. they are human efforts to grapple with 
moral perplexity. The section after that review the field of behavioral research and 
summarizes the implications from the relatively new behavioral business ethics research 
approach (De Cremer & Tenbrunsel, 2012; Moore & Gino, 2013; Treviño, Weaver, & 
Reynolds, 2006). The importance of this descriptive business ethics research lies in the 
empirical insights into situational factors of さbounded ethicalityざ. We then continue with 
a section discussing the challenges that these insights propose for the field of business 
ethics and indicate possible dialogs between descriptive and prescriptive business ethics. 
 
Business Ethics and the Normative Approach 
Until quite recently, business ethics as a field focused on how managers and 
employees should act to satisfy generally accepted ethical standards (see Jones, 1991; 
Rest, 1986). This approach can be described as one where the ³RXJKWV´ and ³VKRXOG´ are 
dominant in SHRSOH¶V thinking about ethical behavior and is referred to as the prescriptive 
approach (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). Using this approach to intervene in management 
practice implies the assumption that if people are told how they should act in terms of 
ethical standards, they consciously will adjust their behavior accordingly. This 
perspective is based on ideas developed in philosophical traditions and includes 
prescriptions about comportment towards self, others, and the environment, and also 
prescriptions about decision-making, both in substance as well as procedural. Prescriptive 
business ethics draws on theories about the nature of what is µgood¶ (ontology) and how 
we can know what µgood¶ is in specific situations (epistemology). Hence discussions 
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between prescriptive business ethicists are most productive when they happen within a 
specific paradigm. Utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics are the main paradigms 
within which prescriptive business ethics is developed. Utilitarianism judges the 
ethicality of an act by looking at the consequences of that act. It is based on the notion of 
cause-effect and the binary abstraction of human strivings for pleasure over pain. The 
good is thus what causes more pleasure than pain for stakeholders. Deontology does not 
consider consequences. Instead, the ethicality of an act is judged by whether or not the 
act itself is good. It is based on the notion that humans can act on free will. This is not a 
whimsical will. Rather, free will is a will freed from ³the passions´ and directed by 
reason only. The good is thus an act which a free will is able to will as an act. The 
deliberation of that ability consists of versions of Kant¶s three tests: universalizability, 
respect for humans as willing beings, and conceptual tenability. Virtue ethics considers 
an act in order to pass judgment on the actor. The good is a matter of living a ³good life´, 
i.e. acting as a virtuous person and being seen as such. It is based on the notion of the 
human telos - the potential flourishing as human beings - which we can only achieve by 
acting as a virtuous person would. Generally, a virtuous person achieves the right balance 
between too little and too much of a virtue, e.g. confidence as the virtuous middle 
between anxiety and hubris. 
We find it important to note that each of these has its own historicity, meaning 
that these strands of ethical theory were developed as an attempt to solve pressing 
societal problems of their time. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill developed 
utilitarianism in the context of social reforms demanding government policies that would 
improve the life of the poor instead of that of the aristocracy. Immanuel Kant developed 
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his thinking in an attempt to give ethics a non-religious foundation in a time when Europe 
was ravaged by religious wars. Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant based science, 
politics and ethics on human reason. It would also be incorrect to state that these people 
did not have an impact, or that those building further within these paradigms fail to have 
an impact today.  John Rawls¶ neo-Kantian seminal work Theory of Justice (1971) 
develops distributive prescriptions from a hypothetical situation in which people decide 
on how to distribute goods and benefits within society, from behind a µveil of ignorance¶ 
where we have no knowledge of where on the social ladder we will live nor of our gender 
or (dis)abilities. What Rawls wants to point out is that there is a rational way to organize 
society in a just way but this rationality implies we can make abstraction of any concrete 
personal situation. Hence, to make a just decision we must take the µview from nowhere¶.  
Another neo-Kantian approach, procedural ethics, became popular through the 
work of Jürgen Habermas¶ discourse ethics (Habermas, 1991). Instead of postulating the 
foundation of ethics in our individual human reasoning abilities, Habermas sought to 
formulate such a foundation in the consensus people reach through dialogue. Habermas¶ 
moral philosophy is thus an exploration of what constitutes a dialogue between humans 
which can lead to an agreed decision. The answer is the µdomination-free dialogue¶ 
(herrschaftsfreie Dialog) or the ideal speech community. It is an ideal-typical situation 
where all those affected can speak without fear and whilst being fully informed. 
Habermas thus formulates prescriptive statements with regard to how a decision must be 
reached, because it is the procedure through which a decision is made that justifies the 
content of that decision. The work of Habermas is also used to develop frameworks to 
understand business organizations as political actors (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
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For the purpose of this paper, the important aspect of the prescriptive approach is 
that it advocates a view point that if people know how they should act, they will be 
consciously aware of these moral demands and hence display behaviors in line with these 
³RXJKWV´ and ³VKRXOGV´ (Rest, 1986; Reynolds, 2008). A prescriptive approach thus 
implies that people are rational human beings, who make conscious decisions about how 
to act. As a result, prescriptive approaches to business ethics assume that bad people do 
generally bad things and good people do good things, because they are rational decision-
makers. Explaining situations whilst sticking to this rational way of reasoning is 
attractive for a variety of reasons (De Cremer, 2009, De Cremer & Tenbrunsel, 2012): (a) 
it is a simple assumption that promotes an economic way of thinking about moral 
violations, (b) allows to blame a few ³bad´ apples for the emerging violations, and (c) 
provides a justified ground to punish those regarded as rationally responsible. However, 
many situations exist where good people do bad things - an observation that has received 
considerable empirical support (Bersoff, 1999; Chugh, Banaji & Bazerman, 2005; Gino, 
Schweitzer, & Mead, 2011; Shalvi, Dana, & Handgraaf, 2011; Umphress & Bingham, 
2011). These observations challenge the accuracy of the prescriptive approach in 
predicting the extent to which so-called rational human beings will display ethical 
behavior. It seems to be the case that because of rather irrational, psychological 
tendencies humans do not always recognize the moral dilemma at hand and engage in 
unethical behaviors without being aware of it. Indeed, Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004, p. 
204) even note that ³,QGLYLGXDOV do not ³see´ the moral components of an ethical 
decision, not so much because they are morally uneducated, but because psychological 
processes fade the ³HWKLFV´ from an ethical GLOHPPD´   
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To make sense of the fact that good people can do bad things an alternative view 
point is needed that accounts for SHRSOH¶V morally irrational behavior. We propose that 
this alternative view point is a descriptive approach that examines more closely how 
people actually take decisions and why they sometimes do not act in line with the moral 
principles that are universally endorsed. This approach is in line with Treviño, Weaver, 
and Reynolds (2006, p. 952) definition of behavioral ethics, which ³refers to individual 
behavior that is subject to or judged according to generally accepted moral norms of 
behavior.´ Important to realize is that such a behavioral approach includes the 
assumption that people do not always deliberately cheat or engage in unethical actions 
because many of our moral judgments and interpretations have to be considered as 
consequences of automatic and intuitive affective reactions. Haidt (2001, p. 818), for 
instance, defined moral intuition as ³the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral 
judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious 
awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a 
conclusion.´ Put simply, our moral evaluations and decisions are not only guided by 
conscious rational thought processes but also by quick and affect-laden processes (e.g. 
Ruedy, Moore, & Gino, 2013).  
Business ethics approaches thus have to take into account moral intuition to 
understand why managers, employees and even organizations can so easily deviate from 
morally accepted standards in their actions and decisions. A famous example of 
illustrating the role that intuitions and emotions play in making moral judgments 
concerns the trolley problem as discussed by philosophers (Foot, 1967; Otsuka, 2008; 
Thomson, 1985) and examined extensively recently by neuroscientists (Green, 2013). 
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What makes the footbridge version interesting is that in terms of outcomes the dilemma is 
objectively the same as in the lever version: in both dilemmas a choice has to be made 
between one person versus five people dying. Although the philosophical tradition of 
utilitarianism would dictate us to simply count in both versions of the dilemma, people do 
deviate from this rational approach in the footbridge dilemma. The reason for this is that 
by pushing a person from the footbridge people are asked to explicitly and directly harm 
someone and because of this association our emotions will come into play and make us 
act less rational (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2007).  
Interestingly, this relationship between doing harm to others and intuition was 
also the main theme of the moral philosophical work of Emmanuel Levinas (Burggraeve, 
1999; Levinas, 1969/2003). It is the encounter with another person that lays a moral 
claim on me. Levinas terms this the face-to-face with the Other - he uses capital µ2¶ to 
emphasize the radical otherness of the other, i.e. irreducible to the µVDPH as PH¶ For 
Levinas, moral claims entail an endless responsibility towards the other. There exists no 
calculation and no principled reasoning that releases me from my responsibilities to the 
other. In that sense, the work of Levinas is radically different from the rational 
approaches in ethical theory we mentioned at the outset of this paper: utilitarianism, 
deontology, and justice. Levinas¶ work provides us with a philosophical account of why 
ethical intuition persistently overrides rational µsolutions¶. It is the physical presence of 
another person that makes us perceive a situation as quite different, something rational 
ethical theories are not able to take account of. The work of Levinas is a reaction to the 
Nazi atrocities of the second world war, and in this sense can be seen as part of 
philosophical grapplings with how organization and ideology blunts ethical reasoning. 
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Arendt¶s (1963) work on the µbanality of evil¶ and Lyotard¶s (1984) critique of grand 
narratives are other examples. These influenced Bauman¶s (1991) work on ³moral 
distance´ to which we turn further in this paper. 
Taken together, the assumption that when people are confronted with moral 
dilemmas they are automatically aware of what they should be doing and therefore are in 
control to do the good thing is limited in its predictive value because of the fact that 
humans seem to deviate from what rational approaches predict. In this paper we do not 
argue that people may not consciously do bad things, and are thus clearly in control of 
their actions, but rather wish to point out that conditions exist where our human 
rationality fails and we are to some extent blind to our own ethical transgressions.  For 
this reason, if we are serious about designing more effective interventions to prevent the 
emergence of unethical behaviors we also need to increase our understanding of why and 
how rational approaches to ethics fail and why there is an irrational element present in 
our ethical-decision making processes. In our view prescriptive business ethics and 
behavioral business ethics are complementary in helping us to understand such questions. 
 
Behavioral Business Ethics: An emerging new field 
When asked to evaluate one¶s own actions, people know that unethical behavior 
implies the actions that ³I could not justify to others on grounds I could expect them to 
accept´ (Scanlon, 1998, p. 4).  But knowing that unethical behavior needs to be 
accounted for does not directly imply that people are able all the time to control impulses 
that undermine our conscious control over our bad and good actions. This point of view 
therefore suggests that the bad behaviors that we have seen committed by corporate 
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leaders in the last two decades cannot simply be seen in light of their ³bad´ and 
³unethical´ personal character. Indeed, it is intruiging to observe that the actors in many 
business scandals do not see themselves as having a bad and ethically flawed personality 
± they consider themselves as good people who have slipped into doing something bad. 
How can we explain this?  
An interesting idea put forward by the behavioral business ethics approach is that 
many organizational ethical failures are not only caused by the so-called bad apples. In 
fact, closer inspection may reveal that many ethical failures are in fact committed by 
people generally considered to be good apples (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004), but 
depending on the barrel they are in they may be derail from the ethical path (Kish-
Gephart, Harrison, & Trevino, 2010). As such, it may well be that all of us may commit 
unethical behaviors, given the right circumstances and therefore we need to zoom in more 
on how individuals process morality information and its flaws and how they do this in the 
larger social setting. Or, as Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008, p. 548) note: ³behavioral 
ethics is primarily concerned with explaining individual behavior that occurs in the 
context of larger social prescriptions.´ The role of behavioral ethics in addressing ethical 
failures is to introduce a psychological-driven approach that examines the role of 
cognitive, affective and motivational processes to explain the ³how´, ³when´, and ³why´ 
of individual¶s engagement in unethical behavior. This point of view aligns well with 
Bazerman and Banaji (2004, p. 1150) observation ³that efforts to improve ethical 
decision making are better aimed at understanding our psychological tendencies.´ It has 
become increasingly more accepted that this approach will allow us to identify deviations 
from actions and decisions based on a rational type of predictions, explain why these 
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deviations occur, and design more effective preventions and interventions (De Cremer, 
van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2011; De Cremer, Tenbrunsel, & van 
Dijke, 2011).  
In the following section, we discuss two topics that have received considerable 
attention the last few years by behavioral ethics researchers. These two topics illustrate 
how psychological processes play a role in shaping people¶s moral judgments and actions 
that are relevant to business and organizations: (a) the processes and biases taking place 
during ethical decision making and (b) the impact of the social situation on how ethical 
judgments and actions are framed and evaluated. Research on these two topics advocates 
the view that when it comes down to ethics, many people are followers, both in implicit 
and explicit ways. More precisely, the field of behavioral ethics makes clear that people 
are in essence followers of their own cognitive biases and the situational norms that guide 
their actions.  
Ethical Decision Making 
Before an actual decision is made in the moral domain, people need to realize that 
their decision may reveal ethical consequences to both themselves and interdependent 
others. Only then, decisions that are violating existing and shared moral principles can be 
recognized early on in the decision-making process and hence be interrupted in a timely 
fashion to prevent further ethical escalations. Or, as Jones (1991) puts it, ³for the moral 
decision-making process to begin, a person must recognize the moral issue´ (p. 380). As 
mentioned earlier, this key aspect in the conscious decision-making process is only a 
given if humans only make rational decisions. However, the behavioral ethics approach 
clearly postulates that we are not solely driven in our actions by reason and that often 
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emotions exert significant influence. As a result, our decisions with respect to moral 
dilemmas are bounded in rationality, which led Banaji and colleagues (Banaji & Bhaskar, 
2000; Banaji et al., 2003; Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005) to refer to this issue as 
³bounded ethicality´. Bounded ethicality includes the workings of our human 
psychological biases that facilitate the emergence of unethical behaviors that do not 
correspond to our normative beliefs. Specifically, people develop or adhere to cognitions 
(biases, beliefs) that allow them to legitimize doubtful, untrustworthy and unethical 
actions. Importantly, these cognitive biases operate outside our own awareness and 
therefore in a way make us blind to the ethical failures we commit (Reynolds, Leavitt, & 
DeCelles, 2010). In addition, this blindness is further rooted in the self-favoring belief 
that in comparison to the average person one can be looked upon as fairer and more 
honest (e.g. Hilbig & Hessler, 2013; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Taylor, 1989). These self-
favoring interpretations of who they are in terms of morality, are used by humans in 
implicit ways to infer that they will not act unethically, which as a result lowers their 
threshold of monitoring and noticing actual violations of our ethical standards (Banaji, 
Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003).  
In other words, the concept of bounded ethicality helps us to understand why 
people can see themselves as ethical persons while nevertheless making unethical 
decisions. This concept of bounded ethicality thus literally includes a blindness 
component, which can be seen as activating an ethical fading process, which as 
Tenbrunsel (2005, p. 96) notes is ³a process that removes the difficult moral issues from 
a given problem or situation, hence increasing unethical behavior.´ Below, we briefly 
discuss a number of psychological processes that influence people to show unethical 
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behavior even if it contradicts their own personal beliefs about ethics. These processes 
are: moral disengagement, framing, anchoring effects, escalation effects, level construal, 
and should-want self. 
Moral disengagement. One important psychological process that biases people¶s 
moral awareness concerns the concept of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999). Moral 
disengagement can be defined as ³an individual¶s propensity to evoke cognitions which 
restructure one¶s actions to appear less harmful, minimize one¶s understanding of 
responsibility for one¶s actions, or attenuate the perception of the distress one causes 
others´ (Moore, 2008, p. 129). In a way moral disengagement can thus be seen as a buffer 
that allows people to free themselves from feeling guilty and uneasy with the idea that 
they may have violated accepted ethical standards. Having morally disengaged thoughts 
makes unethical behavior more likely to emerge. Moreover, moral disengagement is 
particularly successful to reduce feelings of dissonance that would normally occur if an 
individual has strong moral awareness when harming the interests of others. These 
processes have more recently also been studied in organizational settings. Beu and 
Buckley (2004) illustrated that certain leadership types (transactional, personalized 
charismatic leaders) have an influence on how subordinates can morally justify own bad 
behavior. Research on organizational corruption also focuses on the disengagement 
processes that help to rationalize how ³corrupt individuals tend not to view themselves as 
corrupt´ (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p.15-25). 
Framing. Depending on how a situation is cognitively represented has an effect 
on how we approach moral dilemmas and take decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). 
One of the types of frames most studied is whether a decision involves a loss or a gain. 
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Insights building upon the concept of loss aversion (the notion that people perceive losses 
as more negative than they regard gains of an equal magnitude as positive, see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggest that self-interest looms larger 
when people are faced with loss. Indeed, losses are considered more unpleasant than 
gains are considered pleasurable and hence invite more risk-taking to avoid the 
unpleasant situation. Thus, risk-taking often leads to behavior violating ethical standards. 
Findings in line with this notion suggest that losses indeed can enhance people¶s concern 
for their self-interest, and thus give rise to selfish (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Poppe & 
Valkenberg, 2003; Sondak, Neale, & Pinkley, 1995) and unethical intentions (e.g., Kern 
& Chugh, 2009) and behavior (Reinders Folmer & De Cremer, 2012). The current 
financial crisis can be analyzed using the negative frame of suffering financial losses. As 
people are motivated more strongly to avoid losses than to achieve gains, it is in one¶s 
own interest to make sure losses are avoided. One way to do this is to take more risks 
(Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman & Schwartz, 1997). In a business context risky behavior to 
preserve one¶s self-interest quickly takes the form of corruption and fraud. Put 
differently: when looking at a situation in terms of losses, corruption is never far away. 
Recent surveys reported in the media support this idea: employees expect more 
corruption in the future, and are themselves not wholly reluctant to use unethical means 
to achieve their goals (see De Cremer, 2010a). 
Anchoring effects. An important side-effect of framing effects ± as discussed 
above - is the anchoring effect (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). This effect holds that our judgments and decisions are strongly influenced by the 
information that is available and accessible. Importantly, this information can be very 
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arbitrary or even irrelevant to the decision and judgments one is making. This idea is 
illustrated in a famous early study by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who spun a wheel 
of fortune with numbers that ranged from 0 to 100 and asked participants whether the 
fraction of African nations in the United Nations was greater than or less than that 
number. Participants were then required to estimate the actual figure. Interestingly, 
estimates were significantly related to the number spun on the wheel (the anchor), even 
though subjects could clearly see that the number had been generated by a purely chance 
procedure. The ³anchoring´ effect is clear in a sense that participants used the number 
shown on the wheel and then used that number as an anchor ± that they insufficiently 
adjusted away from ± to arrive at an estimate. In a similar vein, it follows logically that 
arbitrary information can thus also set the stage for unfair and irrational decision-making. 
This implies that it is more likely for price increases to be based on the initial suggestions 
of the market itself than on the amount the consumer wants to pay. A clear example is the 
high price of oil observed in 2009. Arbitrary figures caused an escalation in bidding, 
resulting in price increases that were not attributable to changes in availability or demand. 
The same appears to apply to the inexplicable increases on the housing and stock markets 
leading to the current financial crisis. 
 Escalation effects. One important observation concerns the fact that those 
showing bad behavior never arrive immediately at the stage of doing bad. Rather, it 
seems like bad behavior emerges slowly and gradually as can be inferred from remarks 
like ³I never thought I would show this kind of behavior.´ In the literature this effect is 
referred to as the escalation effect or the slippery slope effect. The famous social 
psychology experiment by Milgram (1974) illustrates this principle. His results showed 
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that a high proportion of individuals subjected fellow participants to excruciating electric 
shocks under the instruction of an experimenter. In addition to showing the powerful 
effect of obedience, these results were also important because they illustrated that 
participants were only able to deliver these electric shocks ± and morally accept them - 
because it was built up slowly. That is, participants started off with delivering small 
shocks, gradually increasing their intensity. If the experimenter would have asked 
immediately to deliver the highest shock voltage possible (440 volts) then most 
participants most likely would have denied delivering the shock. The idea behind this 
escalation effect is that ³each step is so small as to be essentially continuous with 
previous ones; after each step, the individual is positioned to take the next one. The 
individual¶s morality follows rather than leads. Morality is retrospectively fitted to 
previous act by rationalizations«´ (Darley, 1992; p. 208).  
Thus, many unethical decisions and actions grow slowly into existence and this 
escalation process itself is not noticed consciously. Indeed, the literature on cognition and 
perception has shown that we have difficulties noticing changes in our environment that 
emerge gradually (Levin 2002). A similar process is at play when it comes down to the 
emergence of corruption, fraud and issuing false statements (Moore, 2009; Gino & 
Bazerman, 2007). For example, research by Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) 
described how auditors are often blind to clients¶ internal changes in accounting 
practices, but only if the changes appear gradually. 
Level construal. One noteworthy observation is that people¶s decisions and 
judgments are more colored by self-interest in the short-term relative to the long-term. As 
Moore and Loewenstein (2004), argue, self-interest is automatic and is thus easily 
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activated when there is time pressure and immediate actions are required. When decisions 
are delayed people seem to apply more easily moral standards and even construct more 
harsh moral judgments. Recent research by Eyal, Liberman, and Trope (2008) actually 
showed that people judge immoral acts as more offensive and moral acts as more virtuous 
when the acts are more distant in time rather than close. Level construal theory can 
explain this (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003). According to 
this theory, acts that are in the distant future cannot be experienced directly and therefore 
are hypothetical. Hypothetical situations bring their own mental constructions with it and 
a consequence of this process is that more distant events (e.g. events on the long-term) 
are represented with it less concrete details. Under such circumstances, people adhere 
more easily to moral standards as guide lines for their decisions and judgments. In 
contrast, events that are closer in time are represented in less abstract and more concrete 
ways. Under those circumstances people will rely more on concrete details and relevant 
contextual information to make decisions and judgments. Then, egocentric tendencies 
will more easily influence the actions one will take. 
Forecasting errors. One necessary challenge that organizations, managers and 
leaders are confronted with is to constantly predict the future. Not only forecasts with 
respect to what others will do but particularly forecasts with respect to the decisions 
oneself will and should undertake in the future are relevant to understanding the 
emergence of unethical behavior. The affective and behavioral forecasting literature (for 
reviews see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005) shows that individuals are quite limited in 
predicting the level of distress they will experience following emotional events (Gilbert, 
Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998;). Participants consistently overestimated 
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their future emotional reactions to both positive and negative events (Gilbert et al., 1998; 
Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). With respect to what people expect 
they will do, literature on behavioral forecasting shows that people overestimate their 
tendency to engage in socially desirable behaviors like being generous or cooperative 
(Epley & Dunning, 2000), and underestimate their tendencies toward deviant and cruel 
behavior like providing electric shocks (Milgram, 1974). Moreover, people also 
overestimate their willingness to forgive moral transgressions by overvaluing restorative 
tactics such as offering apologies (De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011). In a 
similar vein, it also follows that people are biased in their predictions in such a way that 
they will predict to behave more ethically than they actually will do in the end.  
Should-want Selves. Related to the issue of forecasting errors is the distinction 
between the ³want´ self and the ³should´ self. This distinction was introduced by 
Bazerman et al. (1998) and is used to describe intrapersonal conflicts that exist within the 
human mind; notably conflicts between what we morally should be doing and what in 
reality we want to do.  As we noted earlier, people show important forecasting errors 
when it comes down to predicting own moral behavior. Specifically, people predict that 
they will act more morally in situations than they actually do when being confronted with 
these situations. These faulty perceptions and estimates can be explained by the 
distinction between should and want selves. The ³want´ self is a reflection of people¶s 
emotions and affective impulses. Basically, the want self is characterized more as ³hot 
headed.´ The ³should´ self, in contrast, is characterized as rational and cognitive, and can 
thus be looked upon as ³cool headed.´ Applying this distinction to our forecasting 
problem, it follows that the ³should´ self is more active when making decisions on the 
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long-term, whereas the ³want´ self is doing more of the talking when it concerns short-
term decisions. Morality and ethics as standards to live by are thus more accessible and 
guiding when making predictions towards the future. Moreover, because people are 
generally optimistic and have great confidence in their own judgments they will consider 
their predictions towards the future as valid and reliable.  
 
The Impact of the Situation 
The above makes clear that psychological processes significantly influence 
people¶s perceptions, interpretations and ultimately their behaviors. At the same time, 
these studies and the fact that scholars find them salient, show that people are aware of 
what would constitute ethical behavior, or at least people are still trying to be rational or 
give reasons for how they behave, but are unaware of the extent in which they fail to be 
rational. Hence, prescriptive ethics is not a cognitive fantasy of moral philosophers. This 
observation therefore strongly suggests that behavioral ethics researchers need to devote 
attention to the automatic and egocentric biases or heuristics that influences individual¶s 
behavior. Of course, such a focus is only concerned with the cognitive, motivational and 
affective processes that take place within the individual (i.e. an intra-individual 
approach). As we know from social psychology (Snyder & Cantor, 1998), human 
behavior, however, is not only influenced by what one feels, thinks and wants, but also 
by the situation one is interacting in (see also Trevino, 1986). This is an important point 
to make because people underestimate the impact of the situation; a tendency referred to 
as the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). This bias describes the tendency to 
over-value dispositional or personality-based explanations for the observed behaviors of 
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others while under-valuing situational explanations for those behaviors. In social 
psychology several famous studies have been conducted to illustrate the impact of social 
context on people¶s behavior, and show relevance to the emergence of evil and bad 
behavior (Ash, 1955; Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007).   
The Ash (1955) experiments on social influence and conformity illustrated in a 
persuasive manner that social conditions exists that make individuals comply with group 
pressures considering what a correct response is even when the opinion of the group is 
clearly contrary to fact. To test this idea Ash put a group of eight individuals (one 
participant and seven confederates) together in a room and verbally stated which of three 
unequal lines matched a given line. The participant was seated so that he made his 
judgment last. Results showed evidence for the ³majority effect´ in such a way that 
participants deviated from their own personal judgment (which was correct) if the 
majority of the group opted for another response. These findings suggest that people can 
easily deviate from what is considered good behavior if enough others show bad 
behavior. 
The famous experiments by Milgram (1974) into obedience to authority have had 
a significant impact on how social influence can shape bad behavior. As discussed earlier 
in the present paper, his findings were important as they demonstrated that people can be 
easily pressured into complying with evil requests from their supervisors. Despite the fact 
that most participants blamed the experimenter to avoid personal responsibility, the 
findings are clear in showing that people do not stand up to authorities that easily and 
thus are subject to normative and social influences more than they would predict 
themselves.  
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Finally, in 1971 Zimbardo (2007) conducted an impressive experiment at the 
Stanford University campus in which participants assumed the roles of µprisoner¶ or 
µguard¶ within an experimentally devised mock prison setting. It was the intention of the 
research team to last the experiment for two weeks, but due to escalated behavior the 
study had to be terminated earlier. Specifically, many of the participants classified as 
µprisoners¶ were in serious distress and many of the participants classified as µguards¶ 
were behaving in ways which brutalized and degraded their fellow participants. 
Participants were so merged into the prisoner¶s setting that they took up their roles too 
seriously, leading to behavior that was considered inappropriate and unethical at times. 
This study shows the powerful influence of organizational roles and how it can implicitly 
influence people¶s beliefs and consequently their actions. With regard to the direct impact 
of roles in organizational settings, De Cremer and colleagues (De Cremer, 2003; De 
Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005, 2008; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005; Van Dijk & De 
Cremer, 2006) demonstrated in a series of experimental studies that providing people 
with the label of leader makes them more self-serving in a way that they allocate more 
tangible resources to themselves. In addition, this self-serving behavior goes together 
with a belief that leader labels make people feel that they are actually entitled to more 
rewards than when they are provided the label of follower. This is precisely the bias the 
Rawlsian µveil of ignorance¶ we mentioned earlier aims at avoiding. 
All of these studies provide strong evidence that the social context in which we 
make ethical-related decisions can exert a significant influence and derail us from the 
good behavior we are expected to show. This idea of context being a powerful 
determinant for people to act in bad and unethical ways towards others has been central 
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in the work of Bauman on ³PRUDO GLVWDQFH´ (Bauman, 1991). The notion of moral 
distance holds the idea that people will have only ethical concerns about others that are 
near to them. If the distance increases, it becomes easier to behave in unethical ways. 
Interestingly, the work of Bauman was heavily influenced by the earlier mentioned study 
of Milgram (1974) on obedience to authority. One could say that in the Milgram study 
the fact that the participants were sitting in a different room and did not see the 
confederate who was supposedly receiving the electro shocks made it easier for them to 
increase the level of shocks to a deadly level.  
If context is essential in activating the effects associated with the notion of moral 
distance, a specific question to address is how we can understand how specific 
organizational settings influence SHRSOH¶V decisions to show good behavior or not. In 
light of this question, Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowne, and Umphress¶s (2003) approach to 
study the impact of the situation on people¶s unethical behavior and decision making by 
looking at organizational elements is promising. These authors put forward the idea that 
organizational settings carry so many specific features with it and each of these features 
may frame the organizational setting in ways that either prevent or facilitate unethical 
behavior and decision making (De Cremer, 2010). 
A first organizational feature is the kind of industry people may work in. For 
example, the LIBOR scandal where traders manipulated the interest rate known as Libor 
illustrates that a context defined in terms of finance actually encouraged dishonest 
behavior. Indeed, when ex-trader Tom Hayes was sentenced to 14 years in prison for his 
taking part in the Libor scandal, he noted in his voluntarily testimony that the practices he 
engaged in were widespread and blatant in the industry. This claim has been backed up 
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by recent behavioral ethics research showing that mere exposure to money ± an 
organizational feature much present in the financial sector - leads to more unethical 
behavior (Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013). The reason for this causal 
relationship is that the mere exposure to money makes people adopt a business decision 
frame in which decisions are more calculative. In addition, other recent research has 
further demonstrated that people with a calculative mind set act in more selfish and 
unethical ways (Wang, Zhong, & Murnighan, 2014).  
Another organizational feature can be the structure of the organization that creates 
more versus less distance towards others, which can influence the degree of unethical 
behaviors. Two types of organizational structures that are relevant to this issue are 
mechanistic and organic structures (Slevin & Covin, 1997).  Mechanistic structures in 
organizations represent rigid and bureaucratic decision-making structures that foster more 
hierarchical and distant relationships and communications. Organic structures, on the 
other hand, represent organizations that are flexible and use more decentralized structures 
in which it is easier to communicate and relationships are experienced as more close 
(Khandwalla, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Based on the idea of Bauman (1991, p. 
26) that bureaucracy functions as a ³moral sleeping pill´ it stands to reason that 
mechanistic organization structures introduce more distance and hence allow for more 
unethical behaviors to emerge. 
 Yet another organizational feature that is known to frame the work setting of 
employees and thus influence the display of (un)ethical behaviors is the use of 
punishment systems (Mulder et al., 2006; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007). Broadly 
speaking two reasons can be identified that drive the use of punishment in relationship to 
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unethical behavior (Carlsmith, 2006). A first reason concerns the idea of retribution or 
just desert motive, in which punishment is employed to ensure that the perpetrator of 
ethical standards gets what he/she deserves (Carlsmith et al., 2002). In other words, 
punishment is seen as an end in itself. In this view, punishment of unethical behavior is 
morally justifiable out of a negative reciprocity feeling, which may be enhanced when 
power of the one punishing increases (Wiltermuth, Scott, & Flynn, 2013). Moreover, the 
view of retribution uses the important principle of moral proportionality ± the punishment 
evoked should be of the same degree that moral offence was created by the transgressor.  
The second reason concerns the idea of utility or deterrence, in which punishment 
is used to prevent future wrongdoing. The costs associated with being punished should be 
an obstacle for a perpetrator to engage in the same unethical transgressions again. As 
such, violations of ethical standards and the subsequent punishment are usually evaluated 
in terms of its utility. In line with this idea, research by Trevino and Ball (1992) indeed 
showed that the punishment of unethical behavior is perceived as fairer by observers 
when the punishment is more severe.  
A final important organizational element that influences significantly the level of 
compliance among its employees is the perceived degree of fairness in which procedures 
are used to allocated organizational resources, or, also referred to as procedural justice 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1988). When the decision-making authorities, acting as 
representatives of the organization, make use of fair procedures it makes that 
organizational members perceive the organization is a neutral and ethical collective. 
Tyler, Dienhart, and Thomas (2008), in fact, provided evidence that if organizational 
leaders enact fair procedures (e.g. giving voice, being accurate and unbiased in 
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processing information etc.; Leventhal, 1980) employees infer the idea that the 
organization considers the value of morality as an important one. This perception of a 
moral organization is essential to attract the right kind of employees pursuing the same 
moral standards and promotes the emergence of moral congruence between the 
organization and its employees, which furthers ethical and prosocial behavior (Tyler & 
De Cremer, 2009). Importantly, however, is that procedural justice not only builds ethical 
climates that are shared and supported by all organizational members, but it also helps to 
integrate punishment systems into those ethical climates. The reason for this is that the 
enactment of fair procedures promotes perceptions of legitimacy and trustworthiness 
(Tyler, 1997), and as a result punishment and control systems will be endorsed and 
complied with as means to promote and uphold the shared moral standards (De Cremer, 
Hoogervorst, & Desmet, 2012; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2003). 
This focus on organizational elements that significantly impact the emergence of 
ethical versus unethical behaviors indicates that an important task for organizations is to 
devote attention to the design of the moral nature of their work climates.  One step 
towards doing this is thus to create procedurally just climates (Tenbrunsel et al., 2003). 
Another way of doing this is to ensure the presence of a more general organizational 
ethical climate. Victor and Cullen (1987, p. 51), define ethical climate as ³the shared 
perception of what is correct behavior and how ethical situations should be handled in an 
organization.´ In such a climate, it is clear for employees which values the organization 
appreciates and actively pursues and which kind of behaviors will not be tolerated and 
thus corrected. A focus on designing and shaping the ethical infrastructure of the 
organizational climate is therefore an important responsibility of leaders at different 
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levels within the organization (Arnaud & Schminke, 2012; Tenbrunsel et al., 2003). That 
is, an ethical climate puts ethics on the agenda of its employees and defines what the 
organization really stands for. For example, ethical climates can lead to the validity and 
legitimacy of law and professional codes (Erondu, Sharland, & Okpara, 2004). 
Furthermore, ethical climates also promote ethics related individual outcome variables 
such as the development of ethical judgments, expressions of ethical intentions and fair 
and moral decision-making (Barnett & Vaicys, 2000; Buchan, 2005; Fritzche, 2000). 
 
The Future of behavioral ethics: What to do next? 
In this review article, we described the usefulness and importance of a behavioral 
approach when studying issues relevant to understanding the workings of business ethics 
in organizations. It is vital for organizations and business to perform well and evidence is 
mounting that this can go hand in hand with good and moral behavior. So, in a way 
³good´ companies can also do well at the performance level and as such can contribute to 
the sustainability of the organization. A behavioral approach helps us to understand why 
people act the way they do and why they do it. We hasten to say, however, that it is of 
course also important to stress that as a new field behavioral business ethics still faces 
many challenges. These challenges are, in our view, situated in four areas that are 
important with respect to (a) understanding further the psychological underpinnings of 
ethical judgments and decision-making, (b) creating a better understanding of the means 
on how to shape more ethical behavior when such behavioral constraints are available, (c) 
deepening our insights into how to remedy unethical failures, particularly in light of the 
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idea that all of us can fail at any given moment, and (d) critically analyzing and 
discussing the further development of the field of business ethics.  
Below, we will discuss these challenges by pointing out the (1) importance of the 
ratio-emotion distinction (related to challenge (a)), (2) role of leadership in shaping 
ethical work climates and motivations (related to challenge (b)), (3) way we need to 
respond to build trust again after unethical failures (related to challenge (c)), and (4) 
relevance of integrating the descriptive and prescriptive approaches (related to challenge 
(d)).   
The first challenge deals with examining further the psychological antecedents of 
human decision making and ethics. Specifically, it is important that in addition to looking 
at cognitive factors - what we have been doing for some time now (see the present section 
on ethical decision making) - that we also focus more closely on the role of emotions and 
motivations. To illustrate the importance of this shift in focus is the similar development 
phase that happened in the organizational justice literature in which initially a cognitive 
revolution took place as advocated by theories such as fairness heuristic theory (Lind & 
van den Bos, 2002), referent cognition theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998) and fairness 
theory (Folger & Cropanzano,2001), among others. Following up on these important 
cognitive insights, research quickly accumulated focusing on the role that motives (De 
Cremer & Tyler, 2005) and emotions (De Cremer, 2007) play in the development of 
fairness judgments, perceptions and reactions towards injustice. However, we also agree 
with Reynolds and Ceranic¶s (2007) recommendation that ³while we may have perhaps 
overrelied on cognition in the past, we did so for good reason. As the field moves towards 
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other areas « it is wise to integrate into those new areas what research based on the 
cognitive perspective has already established.´ (p. 1622) 
On a related note, future research would do well to elaborate further on the distinction 
between affect-intuition and ratio. Earlier in this review, we made a distinction between 
the rational and intuitive approaches toward morality and ethics issues. Although we 
sometimes know how to judge consciously an event in moral terms, it often is the case 
that we know intuitively what is right and wrong without too much cognitive processing. 
The use of dual-process models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) is therefore a necessity in the 
development of the field of behavioral business ethics. The introduction of such a model 
is arguably not new as concerns about the complex relation between reason, emotion, and 
intuition goes way back to the Stoics and is prominent in Spinoza¶s ethics as well as the 
writings of early Enlightenment thinkers such as Hume (1777/1969), who suggested that 
emotions guide moral cognitions, and Kant (1785), who considered reason the primary 
determinant of moral judgments. Therefore, we do not only need to develop a research 
agenda in which both ratio and emotion/intuition have their place, but also focus on when 
exactly which process is dominating, and, maybe even more importantly, how ratio and 
intuition interact in arriving at morality judgments. 
 The second challenge concerns the development of the concept ethical leadership. 
Particularly in the wake of the financial crisis, the demand for leaders leading with 
integrity and morality is at its peak (Stouten, Van Dijke, Mayer, De Cremer, & Eeuwema, 
2013). Brown, Treviño, and Harrison (2005) define ethical leadership as ³the 
demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and 
interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-
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way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making´ (p. 120). Ethical leadership is 
thus believed to reveal more trustworthy, fair and cooperative working environments and 
intrinsically motivate employees to do what is morally justified for both the company and 
society at large (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009; Walumbwa & 
Schaubroeck, 2009). Although the existing research paints a positive image of the effects 
that ethical leadership reveal, in our opinion, several shortcomings concerning the 
concept still need to be taken care of.   
First, both the definition and operationalization of the ethical leadership concept 
entails a variety of leader behaviors that make up for the complete leader, but that fail to 
clarify accurately what makes this complete leader ethical. Specifically, ethical leaders 
are considered, fair, trustworthy, able to punish or reward, to show integrity and respect, 
to motivate and be the example to follow, making that so many components are involved 
that it is hard to see how research on ethical leadership is different from other established 
research themes in the organizational field. Therefore, it is necessary that an integration is 
pursued between those different research themes and that more insights are provided 
about which components matter more versus less in promoting the perceived morality of 
the leader.  
Second, the definition of ethical leadership solely focuses on how the leader 
him/herself can set the example to be a moral employee, whereas it is also argued that 
ethical leaders should transmit ethical norms and standards across different layers within 
the organization (Schaubroeck, Hannah, Avolio, Kozlowski, Lord, Trevino, Dimotakis, & 
Peng, 2012). In this view, leadership is simply restricted to the one leading. More recent 
leadership studies and reviews have argued to adopt a follower-centered approach of 
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leadership as the congruency in values, attitudes and motives between leaders and 
followers ultimately leads to an increase in leader effectiveness (Boas, Pillai, Bligh, & 
Uhl-Bien, 2006). For example, across a series of experimental and field studies, De 
Cremer et al (2009) showed that self-sacrificial leadership (which falls under the broad 
umbrella of ethical leadership as it represents a leadership style focused on promoting the 
interest of the collective even at the expense of the leader¶s own interests) is most 
effective in promoting prosocial behaviors among followers who are motivated to pursue 
safety and maintenance of the social welfare. Thus, how congruent the leader behavior 
and identity is with the followers¶ values significantly influences how effective ethical 
leaders can be (cf. Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012). 
 The third challenge deals with how people respond once unethical events have 
emerged. Although many organizations attempt to prevent the emergence of unethical 
decisions and actions, it is clear that these events will nevertheless occur. Hence there is a 
need to study the extent to which self-interest versus morality plays a role in addressing 
unethical outcomes. That is, unethical events can happen to one personally or one may 
observe how another person is treated badly. An important question is whether people 
will do something about the unethical event out of self-interested or moral concerns (cf. 
Turrillo et al., 2002). Specifically, will one only intervene and blow the whistle out of 
personal interest or also out of a sense of moral concern with the collective. This question 
is an important one from the perspective of organizations. As many tasks are conducted 
within teams and groups we need to know whether people will report wrongdoing when 
others are the victim of irresponsible and unethical acts. If this is the case then it is easier 
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to build moral communities within organizations that are intrinsically motivated to 
maintain high moral standards at the work floor.  
There is also a need to study how to remedy ethical failures. How to deal with 
violations of morally accepted rules and standards in a way that trust (and by 
consequence ethical beliefs) is maintained? Indeed, when accepted moral standards are 
violated, trust will suffer. Trust is defined as a psychological state in which people have 
confidence that others will act out of goodwill and take the interests of others into 
account (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
Unfortunately, to date, very little attention has been devoted to this issue of restoring trust 
after ethical failures. This is regretful because when ethical failures emerge, it is 
communicated that integrity is suffering and that acting out of goodwill is a problem. For 
this reason, a lack of ethics may erode trust (De Cremer, 2010b; De Cremer, van Dijk, & 
Pillutla, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2011). Hence, in circumstances of ethical 
failures the stakes are high because trust is an important antecedent of organizational 
performance (De Cremer et al., 2001). Companies that manage ethical failures well tend 
to preserve or even promote a trustworthy reputation (Pillutla, Murnighan, & De Cremer, 
2009). Those companies that take a long time to respond to an ethical crisis may be 
permanently hurt in terms of their perceived trustworthiness.   
The fourth challenge concerns the suggestion that, although the present article 
advocates the use of a descriptive approach in studying issues of ethics and morality in 
organizations and business, we do not wish to make the claim that we have to leave 
prescriptive approaches behind or consider it as a field with limited value. Contrary, we 
wish to point out that to further our understanding with respect to the why and how of 
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(un)ethical behavior requires an integration between the prescriptive and descriptive 
approaches. As Warren and Smith-Crowe (2008) wrote: ³while behavioral ethics is 
descriptive rather than prescriptive, good social science requires a thorough 
understanding and definition of one¶s construct -- researchers only want to predict and 
describe ethical behavior, but in doing so, they must define what is ethical, and, therefore, 
they must be in some sense prescriptive´ (p.84). Brief (2012) notes that too little 
consideration to what constitutes right and wrong has left the field of descriptive business 
ethics occupied with the obviously wrong. By drawing on the prescriptive ethics 
literature behavioral business ethics can move beyond the extremes of scandal and 
explore a hinterland of ethically more complex phenomena. An example can be found in 
Harbour and Kisfalvi (2014) who build on virtue ethics literature to examine empirically 
what constitutes courage in an organizational context. The work of moral philosophers is 
used to develop conceptual boundaries of the courage construct, rather than mere 
references in passing. Indeed we need to be able to define what an ethical decision 
implies in terms of its meaning and content, or else behavioral business ethics runs the 
risk of talking about anything and nothing at the same time (De Cremer & Tenbrunsel, 
2012) and become a ³field without meaning´ (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe, 2008, p. 
551). On the one hand, the descriptive approach needs the prescriptive one to give it a 
sense of direction. For example, we discussed the importance of ethical climates in 
organizations. The descriptive work on organizational justice shows that people are not 
only concerned about justice being done to them but also to others. Hence, an important 
task for organizations is to create procedurally just climates that affect employees¶ 
perceptions and expectations that others in the organization act in moral and ethical ways 
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(De Cremer, van Dijke, & Mayer, 2010; Tenbrunsel et al., 2003). A prescriptive approach 
such as Habermas¶ dialogue ethics can be informative as to how to start building exactly 
such just procedures (Unerman & Bennett, 2004). 
On the other hand, the prescriptive approach needs the descriptive one. It is the 
latter that is the content of the former. All ethical theories stem from an attempt to 
theorize ethical µintuition¶: what is it about a situation that makes it (un)ethical, how can 
we know what is ethical. For example, Kant developed his theory in an attempt to 
circumvent a religious foundation for the human knowledge of what is good because he 
was disgusted with religious wars that had caused so much suffering in Europe. Rawls 
sought to defend the notion that the state would secure its citizens¶ well-being without 
imposing on those citizens how they should define their well-being. An example closer to 
the business ethics field can be found in the prescriptive literature on whistleblowing. In 
the 1990s Miceli, Near and Dworkin conducted extensive descriptive research on 
whistleblowers (for an overview see Miceli, Near & Dworkin, 2008). This work has 
caused a huge shift in how prescriptive business ethics discusses whistleblowing. For 
example, Vandekerckhove and Commers (2004) use the descriptive research to argue 
how the debate around loyalty was a mistaken one. Also, descriptive ethics research is 
used to provide complexity to normative prima facie positions on whether 
whistleblowing is a right or a duty, and what the implications are for implementing such 
policies (Tsahuridu & Vandekerckhove, 2008; Vandekerckhove & Tsahuridu, 2010). 
Over a time span of only two decades, descriptive ethics research has shifted normative 
discussions around whistleblowing from a focus on the whistleblower to a focus on the 
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recipient of whistleblowing (Brown, Vandekerckhove & Dreyfus, 2014; 
Vandekerckhove, Brown & Tsahuridu, 2014).  
 
In conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to recast prescriptive and descriptive business ethics in 
light of one another. Although much progress has been made in understanding why 
people care about ethics and morality and the resulting use of moral values and codes of 
conduct in creating ethical climates in organizations, the present paper argued that in 
addition to more prescriptive approaches we also need descriptive approaches that zoom 
in on the psychological underpinnings of why good people can do bad things. Improving 
our insights into why people show good and bad behavior will enable us to prevent or (if 
prevention is not possible) manage ethical failures and promote towards the future. We 
hope that this message will motivate organizational researchers to take up the challenge 
to develop more comprehensive theoretical models of (un)ethical behavior that are both 
informed by moral philosophy as well as have clear practical implications to improve 
organizational functioning and sustainability. 
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